This article presents new information on both methods and rates of payment for physician services in State Medicaid programs. A variety of indices comparing State programs with each other and with Medi-
Introduction
State Medicaid programs have historically had broad policy discretion, within general Federal guidelines, for designing payments to physicians. State discretion has produced considerable variation between States in actual payment practices. These variations have significant implications for beneficiary access to care and program costs. Several studies have shown that Medicaid reimbursement rates have major effects on physician participation in Medicaid (Hadley, 1979; Sloan and Steinwald, 1979; Held et al., 1977; Held et al., 1983) . It has also been shown that Medicaid beneficiaries in States with relatively low rates of payment are less likely to use services in hospital outpatient departments (Gold, 1981) .
Physician reimbursement rates can also affect program costs. Physician reimbursement policy probably offers different potential for cost savings in different States, depending upon the status of current reimbursement policy and the availability of substitutes for physicians, that is, hospital outpatient departments and emergency rooms. States that currently have high fees and few substitutes could probably reduce Medicaid expenditures by reducing fees. States that have relatively low fees and have many substitutes for private physicians' care will probably not save money by further cuts in fees. In fact, such States could perhaps even save money by increasing fees. Because low fees discourage private physicians' participation, Medicaid recipients, as pointed out earlier, are more likely to use hospital outpatient departments and clinics (which are typically more expensive than physicians' offices) and may be more likely to receive inpatient care. Increased fees will lower Medicaid expenditures if these fees sufficiently reduce the reliance of Medicaid recipients on hospitals. Given the importance of fees for beneficiary access and program costs, better information on current policies seems to be quite important.
This article relies on the results of a 1980-81 survey of State Medicaid policies toward physician payment. The original intent of the survey was to provide the basic information necessary for serious consideration of a more uniform set of policies between Medicare and Medicaid. Questionnaires were distributed by mail to State Medicaid directors, and telephone interviews were conducted when necessary to obtain missing information or to clarify responses. All States reReprint requests: John Holahan, The Urban Institute, Health Policy Center, 2100 M Street; N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 care are developed and discussed. The information is important for both State policymakers considering cost-containment strategies and for those concerned with Medicaid access to physician services. sponded to at least some portions of the survey. The survey was designed to collect information that was current as of the last half of 1979. Due to delays and deficiencies in many responses and to the length of time required to conduct the telephone followups, all the questionnaires were not completed until April 1981. Thus there is some inconsistency in the time periods to which the responses apply. Some may apply to late 1979 and others to 1980. Attempts have been made to note these differences, but some margin of error undoubtedly remains.
State Medicaid reimbursement systems
To provide some background information necessary for better understanding the fee data presented later, a description of the basic physician reimbursement systems used by State Medicaid programs is given first. Unlike Medicare, which uses the statutorily mandated customary, prevailing, and reasonable (CPR) reimbursement system, State Medicaid programs can use either the CPR system or a fee schedule (FS) method.
The CPR system used by Medicare limits reimbursement to the lowest of the following: a physician's actual charge, the physician's median charge in a recent prior period (customary), or the 75th percentile of charges in that same period (prevailing). In some States, the 75th percentile is determined on the basis of physicians' charges in the same specialty or subState area; in others, charge data from all physicians throughout the State is used. In addition, since 1975, an Economic Index 1 has been applied to limit the rate of increase in Medicare prevailing charges; Medicaid programs are required to use this Economic Index as a screen as well. States have considerable discretion in applying CPR principles and may deviate from Medicare to a considerable extent. For example, to derive CPR charges, States may use data from Medicaid participating physicians, update infrequently, or use a lower percentile for prevailing charges than the 75th.
Typically, fee schedules are fixed sets of maximum reimbursement amounts for specific, well-defined procedures. They are frequently derived from Medicare The Economic Index was imposed July 1975, in an attempt to limit the rate of increase in prevailing charges. Increases in prevailings were limited to those justified by economic changes. The two components of the index are the nationwide average in incomes adjusted for production and the nationwide average increase in expenses of office-based physicians. or private insurance rates and adjusted over time. In other cases, fee schedules are based on the California relative value studies (CRVS) or a similar relative value studies (RVS) schedule that essentially gives the value of all procedures relative to some chosen standard procedure. Once the RVS system is established, the State determines the price or conversion factor for the standard procedure and multiplies to determine all prices. The 1980-81 survey of State Medicaid policies distinguished between fee schedules without an RVS and fee schedules with an RVS. The essential difference between CPR systems and a fee schedule of either type is that in the former, payment screens can vary between physicians and, in the latter, all physicians or groups of physicians are limited by the same screen.
In August 1979, 25 Medicaid programs used some version of a CPR charge system. Seventeen States employed a fixed-dollar fee schedule, and the remaining 8 used an RVS-conversion factor fee schedule. In general, States using CPR systems increase their fees annually. Seventeen States reported that profiles are adjusted annually, while 8 States do not increase profiles regularly. In Table 2 , the frequency of increases in charge profiles and dates of the last and next expected payment increases are indicated. Some of the difference in reported years is due to the timing of the States' responses to the questionnaire and to the different fiscal years used among the States.
Fee schedules have typically been based on Medicare or in-State private insurance charges in an early year of program operation. Fee increases seem to depend on the resolution of the conflict resulting from budgetary pressures faced by State governments and political pressures applied by medical societies. In most States, budgetary pressures appear to have heavily influenced the outcome of these negotiations in recent years. Some States give a great deal of attention to the development of fee schedules; most are fairly simplistic. For example, States often use established fee patterns (or RVS schedules) and make revisions to the entire schedule if and when resources permit. Fee schedule States are much less likely to regularly increase their reimbursement rates than are CPR States. In Table 3 , the dates of the most recent fee increases, at the time of the survey's completion, are given.
Some Medicaid programs pay different rates for the performance of the same procedure by physicians of different specialties in the same geographic area. Medicare does not require its carriers to distinguish between general practitioners and specialists. Medicare has, however, encouraged carriers to establish separate reimbursement schedules for different specialties and permits them to exercise considerable discretion in defining specialties. The result is that Medicaid specialist reimbursement policies may differ from Medicare policies in the same State. If a Medicaid program 1976 1979 1979 1980 1975 1976 1980 1980 1980 1979 1979 1978 1979 1978 1979 1980 1972 1979 1979 1978 1979 1979 1979 1979 1979 Next expected update (as of August 1979 August )1 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1981 August 1981 August 1980 August 1980 August 1981 August 1980 August 1981 August 1982 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 August 1980 does not recognize specialties but Medicare does, Medicaid fees are likely to be lower relative to Medicare for specialists than for general practice physicians.
States may also vary fee screens by geographic area. Under the current Medicare reimbursement systems, the carriers have divided the country into more than 250 reimbursement localities, ranging in size from sub-county to statewide areas. Some State Medicaid programs have adopted the same multiple locality structure used by the Medicare carrier in the State; others use statewide reimbursement areas. The purpose of an intrastate locality system is to recognize urban-rural differentials in fees and cost of practice. The absence of fee differentials when practice costs vary across areas may significantly affect access to care for Medicaid patients in urban or rural areas.
In Table 4 , specialty and regional differentials as employed by the States are summarized. Specialty and regional differentials exist in 22 2 and 13 States respectively, with 12 States distinguishing by both specialty 1979 1974 1978 1972 1977 1978 1977 1974 1978 1978 1977 1977 1979 1971 1973 1974 1979 1973 1977 1979 1969 1979 1970 1 The reimbursement system includes relative value studies (RVS) and fee schedules (FS Medicare specialty distinctions. Data were not available for the remaining 4 States.
In Table 5 Table  5 , the number of regions that are in use in the 13 applicable States are also indicated. The number of regions ranges from 2 (North Carolina) to 32 (Texas), with the remaining States reporting between 3 and 11 regions. 
Fee differentials between Medicaid programs
Actual payment rates established by Medicaid programs affect physician participation rates, access to physician services, and program costs. Several studies have shown that physician participation rates are sensitive to Medicaid fees. Whether low physician participation means limited access for medical care depends on the availability and substitutability of alternatives, such as hospital out-patient departments and clinics. Using the various methods described in the previous section, a large number of States have limited their fees to control costs of their programs, resulting in substantial variation between States in fees for all procedures.
The 1980-81 survey collected data on fees for 61 procedures covering 9 physician specialties and clinical laboratories. Because of differences in procedure coding systems, several States provided fees for fewer than 61 procedures. Other States did not cover some services included in the questionnaire (for example, eye exams with refractions and therapeutic abortions) and therefore did not provide fees for those services. Despite a number of missing fees, sufficient data were provided to permit detailed analysis of variations in fees between States.
To compare States' overall fee levels, it was necessary to create indices for each State by aggregating across procedures, attaching weights reflecting the relative importance of each procedure. Three types of indices were used. First, statewide price indices were developed for all procedures for all specialties. Second, indices for specialists were developed and compared with indices for general practitioners; the same procedures were used for both general practitioners and specialists. Using these fee indices, the relationship between fee levels, geographic area, and type of reimbursement system were examined.
Statewide fee indices
The first set of indices constructed are statewide weighted average fees, developed by aggregating across 41 procedures. Aggregating was done across specialties weighting by both the frequency and the relative value of the procedure. This type of weighting scheme is preferable to one using only frequencies because several relatively inexpensive services are performed very often. As a result, their fees would dominate any price index using only frequency weights. The relative value units in the 1969 CRVS were used as estimates of the relative value of procedures. For estimates of the frequency with which different procedures are performed for a Medicaid population, actual counts of procedures performed by a large sample of California solo and group practice physicians in 1978 were used. Frequency counts were available for each procedure and specialty. Identical weights for each procedure were applied to each fee in each State.
The fee indices are presented in Table 6 . The variation between fees is somewhat overestimated by the indices in Table 6 because of the use of CPR systems by some States and fee schedules by others. The reported fees are the maximum fees paid by each State. In CPR States, most physicians will face their own customary charge rather than the prevailing charge as the relevant screen on their payment rate. As a result, the rates reported for CPR States overestimate average payment rates. The extent of overestimation depends on the variance in the distribution of customary charges. In most fee schedule States, the physician is paid whatever is lower-the actual fee or the fee schedule. The reported fee is far more likely to be the actual fee paid.
The substantial variance in fees between States remains after adjusting for differences in the cost of living (see "Adjusted Fee"). In fact, the coefficient of variation for fee indices adjusted for cost-of-living differences exceeds that for the unadjusted fee indices. While States such as Alaska and Hawaii are exceptions, the cost-of-living adjustment had the general effect of increasing the differences between States in fees. Southern and Western States, which pay higher fees to begin with, had fees adjusted upward with the cost-of-living index. Several New England and Middle Atlantic States, with relatively low fees, had fee indices reduced by the cost-of-living index. Each State's average fee (unadjusted for cost-ofliving differences) relative to the national average can be seen in column 4. This national average is not a simple mean. Each State's average fee is weighted by physician expenditures in the State. Thus, average fees of States with large physician expenditures have greater weight than States with smaller expenditures. The index numbers show, for example, that average fees in Wyoming and Wisconsin exceed the national average by 24 percent, while fees in Colorado, Connecticut, and Maryland are 28 percent below the national average. Similar comparisons for fee indices adjusted for the cost of living can be seen in column 5. The ratio of each State's fee to a weighted national average fee with the weights reflecting the physician expenditures. 4 The ratio of each State's fee to a weighted national average fee, adjusted for the cost of living.
Of the 10 States with the largest Medicaid programs, 6 have fee indices that are below the national average. Four of these States are well below national average fees. The adjusted fee relative to the national average in these States is .67 for New Jersey, .58 for Massachusetts, .52 for New York, and .36 for Pennsylvania. On the other hand, relative to the national average, Texas (1.42), Wisconsin (1.20) and California (1.25) fees are well above.
General practitioner-specialist differentials
Several States pay higher fees to specialists than to general practitioners to encourage specialists' participation in Medicaid so as to increase access to those practitioners for Medicaid beneficiaries. General practitioner and specialist fee indices were developed employing 29 procedures for which fees were available for both general practitioners and specialists.
In the indices used to make GP-specialist comparisons, it was necessary to construct GP and specialist average prices based on the assumption that each provided the same mix of services. Since specialists typically provide more complicated services than GP's, specialists will have higher average prices even if States make no distinction in fees for individual procedures. To compare GP and specialist fees for similar service mixes, an adjusted GP fee index was constructed by applying specialist weights to GP fees.
In Table 7 general practitioner and specialist indices for each State are given. In column 1, the States that allow specialty differentials are listed. The large differences between the average general practitioner fees (column 2) and the average specialist fees (column 4) are due to the very different mixes of services. In column 3, general practitioner fee indices are developed as if general practitioners performed the same mix of services as specialists. In column 5, the ratio of the specialist fee indices to this constructed GP index is displayed. Twenty-two States show differentials favoring specialists, while 26 States show no difference. Two States did not report sufficient data to permit calculating these indices. Of the 22 States with specialty differentials, 10 States have fee differentials of less than 10 percent, and 6 States have differentials between 10 and 20 percent. Specialists are reimbursed 25 percent more than general practitioners in Georgia, Utah, and Wyoming; 26 percent more in Kentucky and Louisiana; and 30 percent more in South Carolina. Of the 10 largest States (in terms of program size), only New Jersey (14 percent), New York (4 percent), Texas (12 percent) and Wisconsin (7 percent) have higher rates for specialists. California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania make no distinctions.
Medicaid and Medicare rates compared
Differences between Medicare and Medicaid fees have assumed considerable importance because of recurring proposals for the federalization of Medicaid. If Medicaid were to become a Federal program, it would be difficult to justify wide (if any) differences in rates of payment for different recipients for the same services. Thus the immediate cost of increasing Medicaid fees to Medicare levels is of current interest.
To assess the impact, Medicaid rates were compared to Medicare's. The fee data described above are used to develop aggregated Medicaid rates. For Medicare, fiscal year 1980 prevailing charge data were used. The rates for both programs therefore apply to the same time periods. These data consist of the maximum allowable charge (the 75th percentile unless adjusted by the Economic Index) for 100 physician procedures. Medicare prevailing charge data are available for each locality recognized by the program.
Medicaid and Medicare fee indices were created for both general practitioners and specialists. To develop these indices, 10 procedures were used for general practitioners and 22 procedures for specialists. Aggregation was again done across procedures by applying weights based on the frequency of performance times the relative value of the procedure.
In 34 States, Medicare develops separate prevailing charge data for 2 or more substate areas (localities). In 13 of these States, the Medicaid program also uses the Medicare localities for the purposes of physician reimbursement. To obtain statewide indices, aggregation was done across localities in both programs, using each locality's proportion of Medicare beneficiaries in the State as weights. Thus, the statewide fee indices are weighted averages of locality-specific indices.
The net result is that for each State for each program two statewide fee indices are created: general practitioners and specialists. In addition, fee indices for general practitioners and specialists were created for each locality for each program. The Medicaid-Medicare fee ratio for each of the statewide and locality-specific indices was then computed. These ratios are the basis of the comparisons between physicians' fees in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
As explained earlier, the gap between Medicare and Medicaid fees is somewhat overestimated in the indices in Tables 8 and 9 for States that use fee schedules. In States where both Medicare and Medicaid use CPR systems, the reported fees for both programs are the maximum fees paid. As a result, the reported CPR rates overestimate average payment rates. This does not cause a problem when both programs use CPR systems. However, 25 State Medicaid programs use fee schedules that give fixed fees for each procedure. As mentioned earlier, in most fee schedule States, the physician is paid whatever is lower: the actual charge or the fee schedule. The reported fee is far more likely to be the actual fee paid. However, the differences between Medicare and Medicaid rates in the fee schedule States are substantial, and it seems reasonable to conclude that average Medicare payment rates exceed average Medicaid rates by wide margins in those States.
In Table 8 , fee ratios for general practitioners and specialists are reported. For general practitioners the ratio of Medicaid to Medicare fee indices range from .38 in New Jersey to 1.13 in Nevada. The three large States, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey pay less than half of Medicare prevailing charges. Seventeen other States pay less than 80 percent of Medicare rates. These include most of the States with the largest Medicaid program in terms of total expenditures. Ten States pay the same rates as Medicare.
Surprisingly, five States have higher general practitioner fee indices for Medicaid than for Medicare. This occurs for different reasons in different States:
• Nevada uses a fee schedule and does not compare with Medicare.
• Minnesota uses Medicare fees from one of its two carriers and thus pays more than Medicare for several procedures in different parts of the State.
• Delaware uses Medicare rates but does not recognize GP-specialty distinctions, with the result that some GP rates are higher for Medicaid. Comparisons of Medicaid and Medicare fee ratios were also made for each Medicare locality in 15 of the largest States.
3 In general, the intrastate comparisons showed that Medicaid fees in major cities are lower relative to Medicare than they are for the State as a whole. This is true for Los Angeles, Seattle, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Nevada, New York City, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. There are exceptions, notably San Francisco, Atlanta, and cities in Wisconsin and Texas. In most cases, this pattern is explained by the fact that many Medicaid programs use statewide fee schedules, while Medicare establishes payment profiles for multiple localities within a State. The result is that Medicare rates relative to Medicaid are higher in urban areas than in rural. When Medicaid rates do not vary within the State, Medicaid-Medicare ratios will be higher in rural areas and lower in urban areas. This pattern does not occur in Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and Wisconsin, where Medicaid programs recognize multiple localities. In Georgia, even though the statewide Medicaid fees are less than Medicare's, fees in Atlanta are higher than in other areas in the State.
Summary
This article has presented considerable information on how Medicaid programs pay for physician services. In addition, detailed data on rates of payment were provided. Half the States were found to use a version of Medicare's CPR method and half fee schedules. However, States with fee schedules account for 68 percent of all Medicaid expenditures. Fee schedule States were found to increase their fees much less frequently than CPR States. However, a majority of the CPR States placed constraints on their rate of payment, reducing them below Medicare levels.
Data were presented, showing that fees vary considerably across States. Cost-of-living adjustments had the effect of increasing rather than reducing the variation between States. Most of the large Medicaid programs had large average fees relative to the other States. Medicaid fees were then compared with Medicare rates within each State and showed substantial discrepancies. For example, 12 States, including Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California, reimbursed specialists at rates less than 60 percent of Medicare fees (see Table 8 ).
Medicaid and Medicare fee indices were used to estimate the cost of raising Medicaid fees to Medicare 
